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In this article I reconsider the party-level forces affecting the establishment of judicial 
review and judicial independence. Though most current theory examines the 
competitiveness of the party system, I argue instead that the level of party polarization 
should lead to demonstrable effects on the establishment of judicial review and judicial 
independence rules. Using data on party polarization from the Manifesto Project, I 
test this theory on 38 (mostly European) countries. Results indicate a robust 
relationship between polarization and the presence of strong judicial independence 
protections, and also reinforce the importance of party competition for the 
establishment of judicial review. These results have important implications for 
constitutional design and the development of judicial power, as well as practical 
implications for the ability of polarized societies to develop institutions that mediate 
conflict.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Independent and powerful judiciaries have long been seen as the best way to 
limit the power of government and promote the rule of law. Yet, political 
actors generally adopt the formal (de jure) rules of independence that protect 
courts, and the political response to court decisions largely determines the 
power provided to courts. Given the ability of independent courts to 
constrain the actions of elected leaders, scholars, jurists, and political 
thinkers have long sought to examine the circumstances in which political 
actors choose to adopt both strong judicial powers and strong independence 
protections for judges. 
Most prominent theories today focus on competition among political parties 
as a primary influence on the level of independence and power granted to the 
judicial system.1 According to this 'insurance' or 'electoral market' family of 
theories, political parties will be unlikely to seek any form of check on their 
lawmaking power when they believe their party will dominate the future 
                                                 
1 Mary Volcansek, 'Bargaining Constitutional Design in Italy: Judicial Review as 
Political Insurance' (2010) 33 West European Politics 280; Ran Hirschl, Towards 
Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard 
University Press 2004); Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: 
Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge University Press 2003); Matthew 
Stephenson, ''When the Devil Turns...': The Political Foundations of Independent 
Judicial Review' (2003) 32 Journal of Legal Studies 59; J Mark Ramseyer, 'The 
Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach' (1994) 23 Journal of 
Legal Studies 721. 
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legislative process. However, if parties believe they will, at some point in the 
future, be voted out of power, they should seek to implement minoritarian 
institutions and rules – notably, judicial review and judicial independence-
enhancing rules – that will help them to maintain a check on government 
when they are out of power.2  
In this article, I reconsider the party-level forces affecting the establishment 
of judicial independence and judicial power. Building on the large literature 
in American politics3 and comparative politics4 that examines the conditions 
under which legislatures will transfer policy-making authority to other actors, 
I investigate whether the level of party polarization, rather than the level of 
party competition, better reflects the desire by political parties to establish 
independent courts with strong judicial power. For parties within polarized 
political systems, characterized by large ideological divisions between parties 
on important policy areas, the introduction of both judicial review5 and 
strong judicial independence protections can help to rectify failures of 
coordination and provide a practical solution to problems of governmental 
functioning that, as Sartori noted, may otherwise threaten the stability of the 
political system.6  
I examine the role of party polarization both statically by using common 
factors present at the time when judicial independence rules are adopted in 
                                                 
2 Ginsburg (n 1); Ramseyer (n 1); see also Anna Grzymala-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan: 
Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) for an extension outside of courts. 
3 Gyung-Ho Jeong, Gary Miller, and Andrew Sobel, 'Political Compromise and 
Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System' 
(2009) Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 472-498; Terry Moe, 'The 
Politics of Bureaucratic Structure' in John Chubb and Paul Peterson (eds), Can the 
Government Govern? (Brookings Press 1989). 
4 Ginsburg (n 1); Ramseyer (n 1); Grzymala-Busse (n 2); Tom Ginsburg and Mila 
Versteeg, 'Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?' (2014) 30 Journal of 
Law, Economics & Organization 587. 
5 I refer to judicial review and constitutional review interchangeably in this paper. I 
use the term judicial review to denote a system in which at least one court has the 
power to interpret the constitution and potentially hold other governmental actors 
accountable under the constitution. 
6 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge 
University Press 1976). 
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each country, and dynamically, testing whether levels of polarization over 
time can contribute to the adoption of judicial review. Using Russell Dalton's 
well-established index of party polarization and Manifesto Project (MP) data 
from 38 countries, I find that polarization among political parties has a 
significant effect on the propensity of political actors to accept strong judicial 
independence protections.7 However, there is also strong evidence to 
support the conclusion that party competition drives the decision to adopt 
judicial review. In proposing the importance of party polarization, I am not 
suggesting that the competition for policy-making power among parties does 
not matter in the establishment of judicial review or judicial independence 
protections. Quite the opposite, the competition between political parties 
should be critical to the dual decisions to establish judicial review and create 
strong independence rules. Rather, as Dalton notes, the degree of party 
competition may be a 'surrogate for a richer characteristic' of the political 
system – the polarization, or policy extremity, between parties.8 And 
ultimately, party polarization should be associated with the decision to adopt 
strong judicial independence protections. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Polarization in politics has long held negative connotations. From the 
dissolution of the Weimar Republic in Germany to the collapse of 
democracy in 1970s Chile, the consequences of polarization can be dramatic. 
Still, as Russell Dalton and others have shown, polarization can vary within 
countries over time, rising and falling according to the strategic and 
ideological choices political actors make.9 We see this today in the second 
decade of the twenty-first century, where the effects of polarization – both 
good and ill – have become dominant topics in both the popular media and 
                                                 
7 Russell Dalton, 'The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party System 
Polarization, its Measurement, and its Consequences' (2008) 41 Comparative 
Political Studies 899. For an indication of how widely used the Dalton index is, see 
Konstantinos Matakos, Orestis Troumpounis, and Dimitrios Xefteris, 'Electoral 
Rule Disproportionality and Platform Polarization' (2015) 60 American Journal of 
Political Science 1026. 
8 Dalton (n 7) 918. 
9 Ibid 908.  
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the academic world.10 Yet, what precisely is meant by polarization in the 
party system? Party polarization is defined most broadly as the degree of 
ideological differentiation among political parties on a common ideological 
space.11 Polarization involves more than just political differences among 
parties: it refers to a system-wide differentiation among social groups or 
factions, with those groups defined by their strong within-group identity and 
their alienation from or opposition to other groups in society.12 In practice, 
polarized systems are characterized by the presence of significant parties or 
factions on the extreme ends of the left-right spectrum. As Rehm and Reilly 
explain, if a relatively large party exists on the extremes of the left-right 
spectrum, we should witness (and should empirically measure) greater 
polarization.13 Conversely, smaller parties at the extremes should contribute 
less to overall polarization, as their smaller numbers make their 'gravitational 
pull' on the party system weaker than the pull of political parties with many 
voters and many seats in parliament. Likewise, domination of the party 
system by one party should also result in lower levels of overall party system 
polarization: As a given party accumulates more and more voters, the 
ideological distance between that party and any other party will be offset by 
the low number of voters who associate with other parties.14 
Both social and institutional factors can contribute to party polarization. 
Examining the United States from the 1950s to the present, McCarty, Poole, 
                                                 
10 Eduardo Porter 'A Threat to U.S. Democracy: Political Dysfunction' New York 
Times (New York, 3 January 2017) B1; Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, 'Trump, 
Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash' 
(2016) Harvard Kennedy School Research Paper RWP 16-026 <https://papers.ssrn. 
com/abstract_id=2818659> accessed 28 February 2017; Noam Lupu, 'Party 
Polarization and Mass Partisanship: A Comparative Perspective' (2015) 37 Political 
Behavior 331. 
11 Eg Philipp Rehm and Timothy Reilly, 'United We Stand: Constituency 
Homogeneity and Comparative Party Polarization' (2010) 29 Party Politics 40, 40; 
Sartori (n 6); Dalton (n 7).  
12 Dalton (n 7); Joan Esteban and Gerald Schneider, 'Polarization and Conflict: 
Theoretical and Empirical Issues' (2007) 45 Journal of Peace Research 131, 134; Joan 
Esteban and Debraj Ray, 'On the Measurement of Polarization' (1994) 62 
Econometrica 819. 
13 Rehm and Reilly (n 11). 
14 Ibid.  
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and Rosenthal find that periods of large income inequalities are associated 
with greater polarization among US political parties.15 Others suggest 
polarization may be caused by members of the legislature adapting to 
increased homogenization within legislative districts.16 Whatever its roots, 
scholars have long posited distinct political and social outcomes arising from 
polarized systems. Polarized party systems provide incentives for parties to 
take extreme positions on social and economic policy dimensions, which 
result in intense ideological debates over political outcomes.17 For some 
scholars, notably Noam Lupu, the intense debates can be beneficial for 
society, as voter choices become clarified and party attachment is 
developed.18 At the same time, the consequences of polarization present 
distinct challenges for governing in the short-term, while also potentially 
damaging the legitimacy and the stability of the entire political system over 
the long-term.19 
Judicial independence refers to two related concepts. First, it refers to the 
expected effect from formal rules given to judges that should enable them to 
decide cases free of influence from outside actors, including other political 
actors, the parties to the case, and even the judicial hierarchy itself.20 A 
second view of judicial independence is more behavioral: it refers to how 
judges make decisions and whether those decisions are respected by other 
governmental actors – particularly decisions these other actors disagree 
                                                 
15 Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Harold Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance 
of Political Ideology and Unequal Riches (MIT Press 2006). 
16 Sean Theriault, 'Party Polarization in the U.S. Congress: Member Replacement 
and Member Adaption' (2006) 25 Party Politics 483.  
17 Dalton (n 7) 901; Sartori (n 6).  
18 Lupu (n 10); Corwin Smidt 'Polarization and the Decline of the American Floating 
Voter' (2017) 61 American Journal of Political Science 365. 
19 Timothy Frye, 'The Perils of Polarization: Economic Performance in the 
Postcommunist World' (2002) 54 World Politics 308; Sartori (n 6). 
20 James Melton and Tom Ginsburg, 'Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really 
Matter? A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence' (2014) 3 
Journal of Law and Courts 187; David O'Brien and Yasuo Okhoshi, 'Stifling Judicial 
Independence from Within' in Peter Russell and David O'Brien (eds), Judicial 
Independence in the Age of Democracy (University Press of Virginia 2001).  
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with.21 This second conceptualization focuses on the de facto powers given to 
courts, while the first refers mostly to de jure powers.  
In this paper, I focus on legislative preferences affecting de jure 
independence. Certain institutional rules, notably term lengths and 
guarantees on salaries, have long been thought to augment the independence 
of the judiciary by better allowing judges to rule in ways free of influence from 
outside actors. Salary and tenure guarantees mean that judges cannot face 
monetary loss or the loss of their position if they exercise judicial review or 
rule against the government, a belief that goes back to the foundations of 
modern democratic thought.22 Alexei Trochev's discussion of efforts to 
change term lengths for high court judges in Spain, Italy, and Portugal show 
the continued importance of these institutional rules in political debates 
today.23 The ultimate effect of judicial independence is to make judges free to 
decide cases sincerely, based on their own best interpretation of the law, 
without fear of reprisals from other actors.24 Thus, independence-enhancing 
rules like term lengths and salaries also indirectly provide opportunities for 
judges to maximize their own influence in the policy realm. In fact, it is often 
stated that without judicial independence, judicial activism (understood as 
the practice of courts challenging the pronouncements of other branches of 
government) cannot take place. 
III. PREDICTORS OF JUDICIAL POWER AND INDEPENDENCE 
Why would political actors ever willingly create independent courts with 
judicial review powers? After all, political actors place an important 
constraint on their own power when they allow for the judicial review of 
legislation. Given the potential that judges will use judicial review to overturn 
the decisions of the executive and the legislative branches, legal and political 
                                                 
21 Drew Linzer and Jeffrey Staton, 'A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 
1948-2012' (2015) 4 Journal of Law and Courts 223; Julio Rios-Figueroa and Jeffrey 
Staton, 'An Evaluation of Cross-National Measures of Independence' (2014) 30 
Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 104. 
22 Charles Geyh, When Courts & Congress Collide: The Struggle for Control of America's 
Judicial System (University of Michigan Press 2006), 42. 
23 Alexei Trochev, Judging Russia (Cambridge University Press 2008), 259. 
24 See Rios-Figueroa and Staton (n 21).  
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theorists have long sought to understand why politicians would place this 
type of constraint on their own policy making power. Mark Graber, for 
example, has focused on the potential benefits to politicians in having 
independent courts solve politically difficult or sensitive policy issues.25 
Graber describes several notable instances in US history in which legislative 
actors sought, both actively and implicitly, to foist off a problematic issue 
onto the Supreme Court. The Court's infamous Dred Scott decision, which 
ratified slavery in the United States, is one example in which legislative 
leaders saw benefits to judicially created policymaking.26 
Alternatively, judicial independence may be necessary for courts to 
effectively utilize their information advantage when reviewing legislative 
policies. In exercising judicial review, courts can correct problems in the 
lawmaking process, striking down parts of laws that have not worked well 
while keeping those that have worked. However, courts can only do so 
effectively if given independence from political actors.27 Landes and Posner's 
classic work on judicial power focused on the ability of independent courts to 
effectively enforce political bargains, thus encouraging and making credible 
the deal making done by politicians and interest groups.28 
One particularly powerful line of argument focuses on the competitiveness of 
the party system as an important theoretical and empirical predictor of both 
the judicial review powers and the independence ultimately given to courts.29 
The 'insurance' or 'electoral market' model begins with the proposition that 
parties in power, or those groups vying for power at the initial stage of party 
competition, face competing goals and pressures. Parties would like to stay in 
office forever, yet in democratic systems with high levels of political 
competition parties know with great certainty that they will, at some point in 
the future, be voted out of office.30 With this loss of office comes a loss of 
                                                 
25 Mark Graber, 'The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty' (1993) 7 Studies in American 
Political Development 35.  
26 Dred Scott v Sandford 60 US 393 (1857). 
27 James Rogers, 'Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-
Judicial Interaction' (2001) 45 American Journal of Political Science 84. 
28 William Landes and Richard Posner, 'The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective' (1975) 18 Journal of Law & Economics 875. 
29 Ginsburg (n 1) 60; Ramseyer (n 1) 740. 
30 Ginsburg and Versteeg (n 4); Ginsburg (n 1); Ramseyer (n 1); Stephenson (n 1). 
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policy-making authority in government and the legislature. However, parties 
can hedge their bets against future electoral losses by establishing 
independent courts with the power to review and potentially overturn the 
laws passed by parliament. Independent courts, then, allow forward-looking 
political parties in competitive environments to minimize risks from political 
competition – that is, to provide 'insurance' against an uncertain political 
world. In the end, parties in these competitive political environments trade 
off some level of current policy freedom for the possibility to veto or limit 
future policy when they are out of power.31  
The relevance of the political insurance theory can be seen vividly today in 
Hungary. In the 1990s and into the 2000s, Hungary's constitutional court 
developed a strong reputation for independence and power within the 
Hungarian political system, with one prominent observer of the country 
terming Hungary a 'courtocracy' due to the central role of the constitutional 
court in shaping the parameters of policy debates.32 However, after Viktor 
Orban's Fidesz party won a surprising two-thirds supermajority in 2010, the 
party swiftly sought to clip the independence of the constitutional court and 
other independent actors in government. After the constitutional court ruled 
against Fidesz in several prominent cases, the party used its supermajority to 
curtail the jurisdiction of the court, even formally passing laws and 
amendments to eliminate the relevance of past court precedent.33 Why would 
Fidesz take these actions? The insurance theory explains that limiting judicial 
power is a natural reaction to the lack of true political competition in the 
Hungarian political arena. With a commanding two-thirds supermajority and 
a weak, fragmented opposition, Fidesz was able to control the rules of the 
political game, and thus had no need for the political insurance that the 
constitutional court would otherwise provide. Ultimately, the decision to 
curtail the court's powers flowed from Fidesz's lack of real competition and 
                                                 
31 Ramseyer (n 1) 722. 
32 Kim Scheppele, 'Democracy by Judiciary: Or, Why Courts Can Be More 
Democratic than Parliaments' in Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier, and Wojciech 
Sadurski (eds), Rethinking the Rule of Law after Communism (Central European 
University Press 2005).  
33 Kim Scheppele, 'The Fog of Amendment' (New York Times, 12 March 2013) <http:// 
krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/guest-post-the-fog-of-amendment/> 
accessed 5 January 2017.  
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the absence of any political insurance requirements. Still, the insurance 
theory may have its limits. With a smaller majority in parliament, and a 
stronger opposition, the insurance theory arguably does not explain similar 
court curbing behavior taken by Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland since their 
ascendance to power in late 2015. 34 
Similar explanations also have been used to show how the political 
uncertainty arising from political competition can lead to the creation of 
constitutional review powers for the judiciary. Examining 204 countries, 
Ginsburg and Versteeg find that electoral competition between the two main 
parties is a primary contributor to the adoption of constitutional review over 
time.35 Ran Hirschl uses a similar theory to show how new competition 
within political systems previously dominated by one party also can lead 
established regimes to adopt judicial review.36 Country-based investigation 
has found that the insurance theory largely explains the establishment of 
judicial independence rules and expansion of judicial review powers in 
Mexico, and at least partly accounts for the motivations and actions of Italian 
parties during the creation and implementation of the Italian Constitutional 
Court.37 
However, other research has questioned the positive relationship between 
political competition and the creation of rules favoring strong courts. In 
unconsolidated democracies, political competition may have no effect – or 
even a negative effect – on judicial independence. With potentially large 
costs in giving up power to often-mistrusted opponents, there may be 
incentives for incumbents to pressure courts to rule in their favor. In 
Ukraine, increased electoral competition has been shown to increase the 
pressure placed on courts by political actors, decreasing judicial 
                                                 
34 For a possible explanation, see Benjamin Bricker, 'Do Competitive Political 
Environments Always Lead to Judicial Empowerment?' (2017) Working Paper 
(unpublished manuscript). 
35 Ginsburg and Versteeg (n 4). 
36 Ran Hirschl, 'The Nordic Counternarrative' (2011) 9 I-CON 449; Hirschl, Towards 
Juristocracy (n 1). 
37 Volcansek (n 1); Jodi Finkel, 'Judicial Reform as Insurance Policy: Mexico in the 
1990s' (2005) 46 Latin American Politics & Society 87. 
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independence in practice.38 Similarly, Alexei Trochev found that the creation 
of sub-national constitutional courts in 1990s Russia was limited to regions 
in which local governors faced little to no political competition.39 Rather than 
creating courts to hedge against political competition, local governors 
instead appeared to create these regional courts to consolidate their own 
power. Examining a large number of countries, Aydin finds the validity of the 
insurance or electoral market theory of judicial independence to be 
dependent on the level of democratization.40 Notably, she concludes that 
high levels of political competition do not necessarily lead to increases in 
judicial independence in unconsolidated democracies, though this 
relationship is seen in advanced democracies. 
While many scholars have examined the effects of party competition, few 
have examined the potential influence of polarized political systems. Hayo 
and Voigt studied the effects of socio-economic and linguistic 
fractionalization on judicial independence in a cross-national study of 39 
countries, finding that countries dominated by large urban centers are less 
likely to adopt strong judicial independence protections. However, they do 
not directly examine polarization in the political arena.41 In fact, Hanssen's 
study of state courts in the United States is one of the only previous works to 
examine whether policy differences can affect judicial independence rules.42 
Using the national voting records of members of Congress, Hanssen finds 
that greater within-state policy differences (ie, greater polarization) among 
Democrats and Republicans elected to represent their respective states in 
the US Congress is associated positively with the use of the Missouri Plan, a 
non-partisan selection and retention plan for state supreme court 
                                                 
38 Maria Popova, 'Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: 
Evidence from Russia and Ukraine' (2010) 43 Comparative Political Studies 1202, 
1205. 
39 Alexei Trochev, 'Less Democracy, More Courts: A Puzzle of Judicial Review in 
Russia' (2004) 38 Law & Society Review 513. 
40 Aylin Aydin, 'Judicial Independence Across Democratic Regimes: Understanding 
the Varying Impact of Political Competition' (2013) 47 Law & Society Review 105.  
41 Bernd Hayo and Stefan Voigt, 'Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial 
Independence' (2014) 11 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 139. 
42 Andrew Hanssen, 'Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?' 
(2004) 94 American Economic Review 712, 717. 
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appointments that, some contend, leads to greater judicial independence. 
Yet the Missouri Plan still involves an election to retain office, and not all 
scholars agree that the Missouri Plan necessarily leads to greater 
independence. Instead, it may simply trade one problem for another, 
establishing independence from politicians at the cost of dependence on 
majority electoral approval for judicial decisions. Though initially appointed 
to office by the state's governor (who generally works in conjunction with an 
independent selection committee to make the appointment), Missouri Plan 
judges are still subject to a public vote on whether to retain them in office, 
often after only a few years in office. Canes-Wrone, Clark, and Park found 
that Missouri Plan judges were particularly likely to respond to public 
opinion on 'hot-button' issues, possibly because of the need to gain future 
electoral approval.43 These findings call into question whether the Missouri 
Plan of appointment followed by electoral 'retention' truly is independence 
enhancing. 
The varying conclusions seen above leave questions regarding the exact effect 
that party competition has on the establishment of real judicial power and 
judicial independence protections. Still, despite these divergent findings in 
the existing literature, it nevertheless seems intuitive that some aspect of 
political competition should be related to the establishment of powerful 
courts with at least some amount of judicial independence. I expand on this 
thought in the next section, outlining how the extent of party polarization 
within countries can help to explain the development of judicial review and 
strong judicial independence rules.  
IV. PARTY POLARIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
In essence, works gathered or subsumed under the 'insurance' or 'electoral 
market' theory umbrella have established two different tracks with two 
distinct outcomes: one in which minimal party competition leads to minimal 
judicial independence guarantees, the other in which robust party 
competition leads to the establishment of strong judicial review and judicial 
                                                 
43 Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom Clark, and Jee-Kwang Park, 'Judicial Independence 
and Retention Elections' (2012) 28 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 211. 
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independence rules. Certainly, when one party or faction believes it will be 
politically dominant, there is little reason to believe it will seek to constrain 
its own governing power. Whether in party systems or in international 
relations, unipolarity generally results in the creation of rules favoring the 
interests of that actor. 
However, given the range of empirical findings, the second outcome – that of 
greater judicial powers in response to anticipated party competition – may 
require greater specification. Rather than the basic presence of competition 
among parties, the true driving force behind the creation of strong and 
independent judiciaries could be the extremity of political differences 
between these politically viable groups. Specifically, the polarization of the 
party system should have an effect on the power and independence provided 
to courts, with greater polarization leading to greater power and 
independence provided to courts. 
Why should one focus on the more specific concept of party polarization, 
rather than the broader notion of party competition as the driver of judicial 
power? In short, a greater extremity of differences between political parties 
should lead actors in those parties to realize the governance-enhancing and 
problem-solving benefits that come from establishing a third-party arbitrator 
of disputes over the constitutional text. And even though it is true that 
polarized and competitive political systems share some similarities, they are 
also quite distinct in many ways. Political systems with greater polarization 
are defined by large ideological divisions between major groups or parties in 
the system, with major parties being significant in size and having high 
within-group homogeneity.44 These characteristics are thought by many 
scholars to produce particularly acrimonious political dialogues.45 By 
contrast, competitive party systems do not require stark intergroup 
differences, merely a plurality of political parties – in other words, a system in 
which more than one party has a legitimate shot of being in government. In 
fact, it would be easy to imagine a highly competitive system in which parties 
compete among one another for voters – particularly parties close to one 
another on the political spectrum, a point noted by Esteban and Schneider.46 
                                                 
44 Rehm and Reilly (n 11).  
45 Dalton (n 7); Sartori (n 6). 
46 Esteban and Schneider (n 12) 134. 
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In a competitive party system that lacks strong antipathy or distance among 
parties, political actors might believe that conflicts within the political arena 
could be arbitrated within the legislature, and thus not feel the need to create 
a strong and independent outside body to adjudicate disputes. The same 
cannot be said for polarized party systems, where hostility for opposing 
groups is commonplace. However, as explained in detail below, this antipathy 
and mistrust between competing parties and groups could actually spur the 
provision of constitutional review powers and durable independence 
protections that will allow courts to act as both a problem solver and as a 
strong, governance-enhancing arbitrator. 
1. The Governance-Enhancing Aspects of Judicial Independence in Polarized Systems 
Polarized party systems are defined by the large ideological divisions that 
separate parties. As a result, the potential policy implications from changes 
in government should similarly be more pronounced. Sartori found these 
ideological differences, and the swings in policy that can accompany them, 
potentially threatening to the integrity of the democratic system.47 To solve 
this problem, parties or factions seeking a lasting political system have 
incentives to create minoritarian institutions, such as courts with judicial 
review powers. Courts can essentially act as third-party arbitrators between 
rival factions, providing re-enforcement of systemic political weaknesses as 
well as incentives for parties (and political and social interest groups) out of 
power to not abandon the political system. To prevent co-option by any one 
political group, all parties have an additional incentive to provide this third-
party arbitrator (the court) with sufficient power and sufficient 
independence to act as a credible intermediary between political factions. 
Past scholarship has long emphasized the benefits of powerful courts in 
divided societies. For Cass Sunstein, the creation of a strong and independent 
judiciary can serve as way to offset the natural tension that exists within a 
polarized political system.48 Sartori concluded that 'polarized pluralist' 
systems can only endure if the centrifugal tactics of electoral competition 
taking place in these systems are 'lessened, or eventually counteracted in … 
                                                 
47 Sartori (n 6). 
48 Cass Sunstein, 'On Property and Constitutionalism' (1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review 
922. 
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other arenas' within society or government.49 Though Sartori does not 
explicitly state what these other arenas are, courts are increasingly touted as 
forums to de-politicize these intractable social battles. This is not to say that 
the search for political advantage is non-existent in the development of high 
courts: parties can also attempt to create rules that favor their own ability to 
appoint preferred actors to the courts, for example. And by providing 
independence to the court of constitutional review, parties also open up the 
possibility of increased judicial activism – activism that can potentially work 
against any given political party's interests. At the same time, the 
participation of political actors in some appointment systems is not absolute: 
some countries allow the judiciary itself, or a judicial council, to play a role in 
high court appointments. For example, the Italian judiciary elects five of the 
15 judges on the Italian Constitutional Court, and the Latvian Supreme Court 
elects two of the seven justices on the Latvian Constitutional Court. Later in 
the article I examine whether the actors involved in apex court appointments 
could influence the independence that courts receive.50 However, the 
creation of institutional arrangements, such as independent courts with 
judicial review powers, should also serve as a method for opposing groups to 
strengthen the long-term viability of the political system. 
2. The Problem-Solving Benefits of Independent Courts to Polarized Party Systems 
The more extensive differences between parties in polarized societies 
provide a second reason to expect stronger judicial powers in polarized party 
systems. Though these societies should be able to agree on the broad rules of 
                                                 
49 Sartori (n 6) 145. 
50 The importance of appointment rules shows how meaningful high courts have 
become to governing today. The search for advantage in this process can be seen 
prominently today in Poland and the United States. To mediate the role of politics, 
some countries turn to non-partisan judicial councils to select their career 
judiciary, while others emphasize the role of political actors (see Nuno Garoupa 
and Tom Ginsburg, 'Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial 
Independence' (2012) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 201). In statistical 
testing later in the article, I include the number of actors involved in appointing 
supreme court or constitutional court judges as a potential factor explaining the 
commitment to judicial independence. See parts V and VI. In some countries, the 
judiciary, or a judicial council, is one of the actors involved in appointing 
constitutional judges. 
176 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 10 No. 1 
 
government and institutions, greater polarization should make it less likely 
that the competing parties in these societies will be able to agree to key, 
specific details in any governing agreement. Thus, a constitution, a set of 
organic laws, or even a commercial code should be more likely to end up 
underspecified, and in need of future elaboration and adjudication. While all 
constitutions are in some ways incomplete contracts, polarized societies 
should be particularly less able to resolve key constitutional provisions with 
specific statements of policy or belief, and thus more likely to need a third 
party to adjudicate future problems.  
At the same time, the legislative outputs from a polarized parliament are 
more likely to be displeasing to some significant portion of voters. However, 
as Georg Vanberg has shown through formal models of court-legislative 
behavior, the presence of a potential check from judges exercising 
constitutional review should force parliamentary majorities to move toward 
a more centrist position that will not be overturned by the high court.51 
Similar to Vanberg, Alec Stone Sweet uses specific examples from Spain, 
France, Germany, and Italy to show that successfully contesting legislation at 
the constitutional court can force otherwise intransigent governing parties or 
coalitions to moderate their legislative output.52 Such exercises in 
moderation should have particular benefits to polarized political systems, 
where the pull of major parties toward the left-right ideological poles 
potentially threatens the democratic order.53 Similarly, when discussing 
reasons why constitutional designers choose to establish strong court 
systems, Jon Elster notes the potential benefits from being able to 'dump a 
problem on the [...] Constitutional Court, [rather] than to try to resolve it 
immediately.'54 For politicians in polarized societies, there may be no choice 
but to pass off unsolvable issues to the courts.  
                                                 
51 Georg Vanberg, 'Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy 
Compromise' (1998) 10 Journal of Theoretical Politics 299.  
52 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford 
University Press 2000). 
53 Sartori (n 6). 
54 Jon Elster, 'Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the 
Open Sea' (1993) 71 Public Administration 169, 192. 
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The ability of independent courts to solve problems and moderate the 
behavior of distrustful actors also fits well with existing theories of agency 
and central bank independence. Jeong et al. find that political compromise 
among disparate, competing groups largely explains the institutional 
independence given to the US Federal Reserve System.55 Competing 
interests, both in and out of the legislature, sought to check one another 
through the rules of the proposed Federal Reserve System; the result of this 
distrust was a compromise to create an independent organizational structure. 
Similarly, Terry Moe concludes that the uncertainty from competitive 
political systems contributes to the creation of independent agencies that 
protect the main political groups from the 'dangers of democracy' – notably, 
from being out of power and thus unable to shape the legislative agenda.56   
Finally, it is worth noting that the very nature of polarized party systems 
means they are almost assured of being among those seeking through judicial 
review the political 'insurance' that is the hallmark of party competition 
theories. As noted earlier, polarized systems require more than one viable 
political party, with those parties being located far apart on a left-right scale. 
Thus, the greater independence given to some courts, which may at first 
glance be viewed as an issue of party competition or fractionalization, could 
instead be a product of party polarization. 
In short, the establishment of judicial review powers and strong judicial 
independence rules should involve not just a prevalence of parties, but also 
the presence of serious debates and divisions within society such that parties 
will believe it in their respective interests to establish a strong and 
independent court that can both regulate policy and provide the possibility 
of future (or current) checks on the power of political opponents. Thus, it is 
reasonable to predict that when there is greater polarization in the party 
system at the time when judicial review is adopted, we will also see the 
adoption of greater formal independence for high court judges. 
                                                 
55 Jeong et al (n 3).  
56 Moe (n 3) 275. However, Moe does not find many positive consequences from 
agency independence. 
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V. RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND VARIABLES 
To examine whether polarization of the political system contributes, first, to 
the adoption of judicial review and, second, to greater independence for 
judges, I employ two strategies. First, I use longitudinal data from 38 
countries to see whether polarization over time is associated with the 
decision to adopt judicial review.57 Second, I examine nearly all of those same 
countries at the time judicial review is adopted to answer a related question: 
is the adoption of judicial review also associated with greater formal 
protections given to the judiciary? 
Thus, this article examines two questions: to what degree does polarization 
lead to the adoption of judicial review, and to what degree does it lead to the 
adoption of strong judicial independence rules. To avoid the problem of 
selection bias in answering the first question, countries included in this study 
were not selected based on whether they had adopted judicial review. 
Instead, selection is based on the availability of data – particularly, data on 
the party system within each country over a long period of time. As a practical 
reality, though, nearly all of the countries observed in this study (though not 
all) eventually do adopt some form of judicial review. As explained in detail 
below, I use the Manifesto Project's data on political parties because, with 
data going back to 1945, it covers the longest time period of any database on 
electoral parties. 
However, the presence and timing of judicial review is crucial to answer the 
second question on the adoption of judicial independence protections, as the 
decision to create judicial review provides the necessary precondition for 
courts to potentially overturn legislative acts. With only statutory 
interpretation powers, courts do not have the final word on policy or on legal 
interpretation: legislatures could always modify any judicial interpretation of 
statutes by re-writing or amending the laws. By creating judicial review 
political actors limit themselves in a very real sense, which makes the 
independence protection they afford to courts a critical question. Thus, for 
this second question I examine only those countries that have adopted 
judicial review. 
                                                 
57 See appendix 3 for the list of countries. 
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I measure party polarization using the Manifesto Project's (MP) left-right 
party scores. The Manifesto Project is a longstanding, comprehensive effort 
by political scientists to collect all party statements and policy positions from 
official party manifestos, or platforms, and use them to create numerical left-
right scores for every party competing in national elections. Currently, their 
database covers party preferences for over 1,000 parties in over 50 countries. 
Combined with its extensive coverage period, Manifesto Project scores are 
ideal for observing the presence and extent of polarization across multiple 
countries over time. However, several countries with current MP data and 
judicial review powers had to be excluded from study because the adoption of 
judicial review occurred before MP data begins. Australia, Norway, Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico, Denmark, and the United States all initiated judicial 
review well before accurate MP party data is available, and thus were excluded 
from the study.58 Appendix 3 lists the countries included in the study.59  
1. Dependent Variables 
To examine the onset of judicial review, I created a dichotomous variable that 
captures the year in which judicial review was adopted in each country.60 
With my party polarization measure based on Manifesto Project data, I am 
able to track the onset of judicial review as far back as their data allows me – 
generally, the first post-World War II election. Similar to the approach used 
                                                 
58 Ginsburg and Versteeg (n 4) conclude Denmark does not have judicial review, 
likely due to the Danish Supreme Court's historical reticence to use its power. See 
also Jens Rytter and Marlene Wind, 'In Need of Jurisotcracy? The Silence of 
Denmark in the Development of European Legal Norms' (2011) 9 I-CON 470, 474. 
59 Greece is included in the study, though its unique constitutional court 
appointment structure could result in its exclusion. Judges on both the Court of 
Cassation and Council of State (who have life tenure) are selected randomly to serve 
two-year terms on the Supreme Special Court, which hears final constitutional 
claims (see Epaminondas Spiliotopoulos, 'Judicial Review of Legislative Acts in 
Greece' (1983) 56 Temple Law Quarterly 463). Thus, the judges on Greece's 
constitutional court could be considered to have two-year terms, or life terms. In 
line with Ginsburg (n 1), I chose to code the Greek constitutional court judges as 
holding two-year terms, a much harder test for my hypotheses.  
60 As noted in footnote 5, I define judicial review as the establishment of a court with 
the power to interpret the constitution and potentially hold other governmental 
actors accountable under the constitution. 
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by Ginsburg and Versteeg, observations from that country disappear from 
the dataset once judicial review is established. 
To examine the strength of judicial independence rules, I use two common 
measures that indicate a commitment to judicial independence. The first is 
an additive judicial independence index created by Feld and Voigt.61 That 
index consists of 12 factors that should promote greater judicial 
independence, including term lengths, salary guarantees, salary adequateness, 
reappointment possibilities, judicial review powers, publishing powers, and 
ease of constitutional amendment.62 Their analysis included 71 countries, 31 
of which overlap with the countries included in this study. I was able to 
complete Feld and Voigt scores for the six remaining countries by following 
the basic coding scheme set out in their paper. Though this index is 
commonly used for testing purposes, the Feld and Voigt index also has been 
criticized for its measurement strategy. Rather than 12 concepts affecting 
judicial independence equally, it is possible that a much smaller, core set of 
variables best captures the credibility of judicial independence rules.63 An 
additional concern comes from the fact that Feld and Voigt's data are based 
on contemporary (as of 2003) observations of judicial independence 
institutions, though later studies indicate that constitutional change in any 
one of these variables is extremely rare.64  
Because this study examines whether there is any link between the party 
system (specifically, party polarization) and the creation or ratification of 
judicial independence rules at the time the power of judicial review is 
                                                 
61 Lars Feld and Stefan Voigt, 'Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross 
Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators' (2003) 19 European Journal of 
Political Economy 497. 
62 The 12 factors are: (1) court powers specified in constitution; (2) ease of amendment 
to constitution; (3) appointments to court; (4) judicial tenure; (5) judicial removal 
procedures; (6) judicial re-appointment possibility; (7) salary guarantees; (8) 
adequate court pay compared to legal peers; (9) ability to access court; (10) case 
allocation rules; (11) constitutional review powers; (12) courts publish decisions. 
63 Eg Melton and Ginsburg (n 20); Ginsburg (n 1); Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and Andrei Shleifer, 'Judicial Checks and 
Balances' (2004) 112 Journal of Political Economy 445. All of these works use 
between one to six core variables to measure judicial independence.  
64 Hayo and Voigt (n 41).  
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established, I use as a second dependent variable the term length given to 
judges on the final court of constitutional review when judicial review was 
established.65 Term lengths, the only common variable within the previous 
studies of de jure judicial independence mentioned above, should provide a 
strong indication of commitment on the part of political actors to judicial 
independence. Longer term lengths signal to judges that they will not be 
punished with loss of office by the current government for decisions made 
while on the court. Longer term lengths also help to avoid career-based 
independence pressures, notably the concern that departing high court 
judges would need to curry favor with the current government to advance 
their post-court career plans.66 Similarly, as Geyh and Ginsburg both note, 
shorter term lengths allow current legislative majorities a greater ability to 
punish judges who rule against their interests.67 
Though life tenure is often granted to judges, many countries also mandate 
retirement ages, typically at 65 to 70 years of age. Thus, 'life tenure' is often 
much shorter than initially assumed. Because of this caveat, Ginsburg makes 
the assumption for testing purposes that life tenure equals the longest fixed 
term in his dataset.68 My own testing will consider life tenure in two ways. 
First, in line with Ginsburg's previous work, I will measure life tenure as one 
year longer than the longest fixed term in my dataset set – in this case 16 years 
(15 years is the longest fixed term in my dataset). Thus, the outcome I am 
examining ultimately is a count of the number of years in the terms given to 
                                                 
65 Using data from Zackary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, Comparative 
Constitutions Project (2015) <http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org> 
accessed 21 September 2016; Ginsburg (n 1); Robert Maddex, Constitutions of the 
World (CQ Press 1995). 
66 Eg Benjamin Bricker, Visions of Judicial Review (ECPR Press 2016); Lucia Pellegrina 
and Nuno Garoupa, 'Choosing Between the Government and the Regions: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Italian Constitutional Court Decisions' (2013) 52 
European Journal of Political Research 1. 
67 Geyh (n 22); Ginsburg (n 1). O'Brien and Okhoshi (n 20) also discuss the importance 
of tenure in the context of the Japanese judiciary, though its importance to 
independence can be seen as far back as 1600s England (see Douglass North and 
Barry Weingast, 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional 
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England' (1989) 49 Journal of 
Economic History 803). 
68 Ginsburg (n 1). 
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constitutional judges that is 'top-censored' (that is, limited at the maximum 
number of years granted to judges), which calls for the use of a negative 
binomial model.69 The negative binomial model is a commonly-used 
generalized linear model that provides accurate parameter estimates when 
the dependent variable is a count70 and the data is overdispersed – that is, 
where the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean, as occurs 
here.71  
I have also created a second operationalization of the dependent variable in 
which judicial tenure is indexed into four groups, with life tenure receiving 
the highest score ('4'), tenures between 10 and 15 years receiving a score of '3,' 
tenures between seven and nine years a score of '2,' and tenures of one to six 
years receiving the lowest score ('1'). This second operationalization requires 
an ordered logit model to be used, as the response variable is categorical, 
contains more than two response categories, and can be ordered. Both the 
negative binomial and the ordered logit model are specific iterations of what 
is referred to as a 'generalized linear model,' or GLM. GLMs are a class of 
regression models that can be used when the classical Ordinary Least Squares 
                                                 
69 In Appendix 2, I report the results of tests using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression in place of negative binomial regression. Substantive results do not 
change using OLS.  
70 In classical statistical terms, the count refers to the number of times some 
phenomenon occurs. This can include the number of wars that occur over a time 
period or the number of days until an event occurs, such as the number of days it 
takes to sign a contract. 
71 Variance represents the expectation of how far apart a random data point will be 
from the mean. In statistics, variance is measured by squaring the standard 
deviation. Here, the variance of tenure is 16.1 and the mean is 11.2. The negative 
binomial is appropriate in these circumstances, as it is essentially an extension of a 
Poisson model that allows for greater variance. In the negative binomial, the 
dependent variable count is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution while the 
variation in the mean follows a gamma distribution – thus the observed dependent 
variable is assumed to mix the Poisson and gamma distributions. The count is 
assumed to be a random variable, which makes it particularly well suited to 
examining heterogeneous data – for example, data from multiple countries. See 
Gary King, 'Variance Specification in Event Count Models: From Restrictive 
Assumptions to a Generalized Estimator' (1989) 33 American Journal of Political 
Science 762, 767-68; Michael Finkelstein and Bruce Levin, Statistics for Lawyers 
(Springer 2015). 
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(OLS) linear regression model is not appropriate. Specifically, GLMs can be 
used when certain OLS assumptions do not hold, including the assumption 
of a linear relationship between outcome and predictor variables and the 
assumption that data is normally distributed. Relatedly, with some data OLS 
regression may not be the most efficient – that is, the OLS estimator may not 
provide the lowest variance. Count data is one instance in which OLS is not 
the most efficient estimator. GLMs are most often used for binary data, 
count data, and ordered responses, and use a link function to linearize the 
relationship between the predictor variables and the response.  
The use of either model is based on the type of outcome that is analyzed. The 
ordered logit is most appropriate for categories of outcomes, with the values 
within the categories having a true sequential order from low to high. 
Examples in which the ordered logit should be used include the level of 
happiness reported by individuals in a survey (low, medium, high), or bond 
ratings (A, AA, AAA).72 The negative binomial is most appropriate when the 
outcome is a count of some phenomenon, including the number of wars 
fought by a country, the number of years given to judicial terms, or the 
number of days it takes to sign a contract, and the data is overdispersed.73  
2. Independent Variable 
For both sets of tests, the main independent variable is the left-right party system 
polarization score for each country in the election year immediately 
preceding, or closest to, the establishment of judicial review. As noted earlier, 
to measure polarization I begin by using the statements on major issues that 
are contained in each political party's official manifesto, as collected by the 
Manifesto Project (MP).74 After collecting each party's official statements, 
                                                 
72 Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics (Blackwell 2008), 258-60; Alan Agresti, 
Foundations of Linear and Generalized Linear Models (Wiley 2015), 202-06. 
73 Joseph Hilbe, Negative Binomial Regression (Cambridge University Press 2011); King 
(n 71); Agresti (n 72) 247.  
74 MP uses their data to create a general right-left score (called RILE), which is 
comprised of 26 issue dimensions, including social and economic issues. The issues 
used to create the left-right polarization score are: 104, 201, 203, 305, 401, 402, 407, 
414, 505, 601, 603, 605, 606, 103, 105, 106, 107, 202, 403, 404, 406, 412, 413, 504, 506, 
701. For complete descriptions of each issue, see Manifesto Project Database, 
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MP researchers then code those statements numerically to create a left-right 
score for each party competing in every national election. Listed in Appendix 
4, the statements used to create the left-right score run the gamut from party 
views on global trade and labor protections to statements on socio-political 
issues like nationalism, social harmony, and imperialism. The left-right scores 
created by MP are then used in Russell Dalton's party polarization index 
formula to create the polarization score for each country.75 Dalton's formula 
utilizes the summed total of each party's vote share multiplied by that party's 
left-right score minus the party system left-right score, measured as follows: 
Party system polarization score = 
√{∑( 
 ℎ ) ∗ ([  /  –    
. /
  ]/5)} 
By multiplying each party's vote share in a given election by their numeric 
difference from the average party system left-right score in that same 
election, the equation allows us to numerically observe the extent of 
polarization in every election within each country. Larger numbers from the 
equation indicate higher levels of polarization and smaller numbers indicate 
less polarized party systems.  
Other researchers have developed similar left-right scores for political 
parties, though for my research Manifesto Project scores are preferable to 
other party system measurements.76 First, the MP data extends over a much 
longer time period – their quantitative data covers democratic elections since 
1945.77 This temporal element is particularly important for this study, in that 
                                                 
<https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu> accessed 21 September 2016. The issue 
categories are listed in Appendix 4.  
75 Dalton (n 7) 9. 
76 Prominent alternatives include the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. See CSES, <http://www.cses.org> 
accessed 12 April 2017; Ryan Bakker and others, '2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey' 
<chesdata.eu> accessed 12 April 2017. 
77 MP provides quantitative data analysis of elections since 1945. I do not expect any 
selection bias, or any correlation between the countries selected and party 
polarization as a result of this choice of data. In fact, the presence of competitive 
elections only makes successfully testing my theory more difficult. Andrea 
Volkens, Pola Lehmenn, Theres Matthieß, Sven Regel, Nicolas Merz, and Annika 
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I seek to measure the positions of parties (and judicial independence rules) at 
the time judicial review was created. One prominent party scoring 
alternative, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), has 
relatively wide geographical coverage but is a relatively recent project: its 
coverage only goes back to 1996. Yet, virtually all of the countries studied 
here adopted judicial review previous to 1996. Similarly, another party 
placement estimator, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, begins in 1999 – too late 
for the purposes of this project.78  
Second, the Manifesto Project's focus on political party statements should 
lead to more accurate placements. One questionable feature of citizen 
surveys is the ability of citizens to accurately place all relevant parties on a 
left-right continuum.79 At the same time, some have criticized reliance on 
party manifesto statements, viewing them as posturing or position taking 
designed to appeal to the party's core supporters, but that have little chance 
of becoming governing policy. In one sense, this could detract from the 
reliability of MP scores. Yet, for this study such posturing should only 
highlight the underlying polarization of society.  
The observations used for the establishment of judicial independence rules 
represent the time at which the latest democratic constitution was 
established. Thus, the establishment of judicial review is often roughly 
concurrent with the establishment of constitutional democracy. However, in 
some countries tenure and access rules had already been created previous to 
the establishment of judicial review. For example, in Sweden constitutional 
revisions in the 1970s gave courts judicial review powers, and in Finland major 
legislative revisions in 2000 also provided judicial review for the first time in 
that country's history.80 Yet even in circumstances in which tenure rules had 
been established previous to the establishment of judicial review, the 
polarization of the legislature at the time judicial review is established should 
                                                 
Werner, The Manifesto Data Collection (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung 2016).  
78 Marco Steenbergen and Gary Marks, 'Evaluating Expert Judgments' (2007) 46 
European Journal of Political Research 347. 
79 G Bingham Powell, 'The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of 
Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules' 
(2009) 42 Comparative Political Studies 1475, 1477. 
80 Hirschl, ‘Nordic Counternarrative’ (n 36) 450. 
186 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 10 No. 1 
 
still matter. Notably, parliament, in introducing its new rules on judicial 
review, is free to take steps to alter the existing tenure of judges (as in the 
cases of Sweden in the 1970s, Canada in 1982, and Finland in 2000). 
3. Control Variables 
I include several control variables to account for other factors that could 
potentially influence the creation of (a) judicial review and (b) strong judicial 
independence rules. Regarding the establishment of judicial review, I largely 
follow the fixed effects variables used by Ginsburg and Versteeg in their own 
analysis of the decision to adopt judicial review.81 Specifically, I include their 
data for variables capturing whether (a) sharing a common history of legal 
origin (eg common law, civil law, or other tradition), (b) sharing a common 
religion, and (c) sharing common borders with other countries that adopted 
judicial review could contribute to the likelihood that a given country will 
adopt judicial review itself.82 I also use their over-time measure of party 
competition, which records the seat difference between the top two parties 
in parliament.  
As with the adoption of judicial review, legal origins also could contribute to 
the differences seen among countries in the adoption of judicial 
independence rules, notably term lengths.83 Common law systems often 
provide for life tenure. Conversely, civil law systems generally provide only 
limited terms for constitutional court judges. Thus, it may be expected that 
common law systems will exert a positive effect on judicial tenures and other 
independence rules, all else equal.  
Additionally, the number of constitutional actors involved in the 
appointment and confirmation process could contribute to the formation of 
judicial independence rules. Shorter tenures and other limits on formal 
judicial independence may be particularly prevalent when one actor has sole 
discretion over appointments, as that actor holds sole power to alter the 
                                                 
81 Ginsburg and Versteeg (n 4).  
82 Ginsburg and Versteeg differentiate between Christian denominations in their 
data. Their categorization includes Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, and 
Protestantism. Thus, despite the fact that most countries are Christian, there is 
significant variation among the countries included in the study. 
83 La Porta et al (n 63); Ginsburg (n 1). 
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composition of the court. Accordingly, the variable Constitutional Appointers 
tracks the number of actors or institutions given at least partial responsibility 
over high court appointments.  
Finally, I account for the effect of political competition in the creation of 
judicial independence rules. Previous testing has operationalized party 
competition as differences between party vote or seat percentages.84 I follow 
this strategy, measuring the variable Party Competition as the percentage vote 
difference between the top vote-getting parties in the election closest to the 
establishment of judicial review. 
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
1. The Decision to Establish Judicial Review 
The first set of tests examines to what extent party polarization affects the 
likelihood that countries will adopt judicial review. I examine every election 
held by 38 countries until the year in which constitutional judicial review is 
adopted.85 Though the selection of cases was based on Manifesto Project data 
availability, all but one country in my dataset (the Netherlands) eventually did 
adopt some form of constitutional review procedure. Additionally, all 
observations of the rate of party polarization, party competition, and other 
variables are based on the data available in each election year until the year 
judicial review is adopted, after which the country disappears from the 
analysis.86 Overall, a total of 109 election years are examined. Because the data 
can include multiple election years from one country, I use a logit model with 
robust standard errors clustered by country. The logit model is ideal for an 
outcome that is dichotomous. In this case, the outcome is whether a country 
adopts judicial review (1) or not (0) in a given year. 
Examining the initial data on the adoption of judicial review, there is 
evidence that the level of party competition has a moderate influence on the 
likelihood that judicial review will be adopted, and no evidence that party 
                                                 
84 Ginsburg (n 1); Popova (n 38); Ginsburg and Versteeg (n 4).  
85 South Korea is excluded from this first analysis due to the absence of needed 
control data on legal origin and common religion (see Ginsburg and Versteeg (n 4)). 
86 Because polarization is measured based on party electoral manifestos, polarization 
of the party system is measured in each election year. 
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polarization influences the decision to adopt judicial review. This largely 
confirms Ginsburg and Versteeg's conclusion regarding the important role of 
party competition in the development of judicial review, though it should be 
noted that party competition reaches only a modest level of statistical 
significance (the 0.10 level). This somewhat weak connection between party 
competition and the establishment of judicial review could be the result of 
the shorter time frame I consider: Ginsburg and Versteeg do not consider 
party polarization, and so are able to utilize a longer time period for their 
analysis (which begins in the 1790s). 
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Table 1. Logit estimates of the decision to adopt judicial review, by election. 
 Model 1 
Constant -63.97 
(40.18) 
Party Polarization 0.01 
(0.14) 
Party Competition  1.87* 
(1.00) 
Legal Origin 2.61* 
(1.42) 
Common Borders -0.16 
(1.09) 
Common Religion 2.09** 
(1.01) 
Year adopted 0.03 
(0.02) 
N 109 
Wald χ2 24.15** 
Pseudo-R2 0.24 
Log Likelihood -52.70 
AIC 119.39 
*p ≤0.10, ** p ≤0.05. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in 
parentheses. Results are two-tailed. Squaring the 'year adopted' variable does 
not change results significantly.  
2. The Establishment of Judicial Independence Rules 
Though polarization has a limited relationship to the establishment of 
judicial review, its role in the creation and maintenance of strong judicial 
independence protections appears quite strong, as seen in Table 2 below. To 
analyze the connection between polarization and the creation of judicial 
independence rules, I estimate regression models for the two main 
dependent variables of interest: the Feld and Voigt 12-part index of judicial 
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independence, and judicial term lengths. The first dependent variable in this 
study is the number of years granted to judges on courts of constitutional 
review, and is estimated using a negative binomial model. The second 
dependent variable is an indexed measure of tenure, and is estimated using an 
ordered logit model. The final dependent variable is the 12-part Feld and 
Voigt judicial independence index, which takes values distributed as a 
proportion between 0 and 1. Beta regression models are the most appropriate 
estimator for modeling continuous dependent variables, like percentages and 
proportions, that are distributed within the 0 to 1 interval.87 
From the first column of Table 2 (see Model 1), which presents the results of 
the negative binomial model, it is apparent that more polarized party systems 
exert a direct and significant effect on judicial independence protections. 
Notably, increased polarization leads to concomitant increases in the average 
term length given to high court judges. This remains true even when 
accounting for the effect of direct party competition, measured here as the 
difference between the vote percentages obtained by the first and second 
highest vote-getting parties.88 
Further, the effect of polarization is strong and significant even with the 
presence of additional controls for common law legal origin, the level of 
democracy within each country, and the number of different institutional 
actors involved in the selection of judges. Regression coefficients from a 
negative binomial model cannot be interpreted in the same way as an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model: notably, the coefficients do not show 
the effect of a one-unit change in a predictor variable on the outcome 
variable. However, the coefficients can be interpreted as the 'average 
response,' with the average response being one estimate of the marginal 
                                                 
87 Silvia Ferrari and Francisco Cribari-Neto, 'Beta Regression for Modelling Rates 
and Proportions' (2004) 31 Journal of Applied Statistics 799. I also estimate this 
model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Results from OLS 
regression are substantively similar to the Beta regression model.  
88 The correlation between the Polarization variable and the Competition variable is 
minimal (correlation = 0.029), which suggests including both variables in one 
statistical test will not skew results. This also suggests that the two variables are 
capturing different aspects of the political world, and that the two concepts can 
meaningfully be separated out for analysis.  
2017}  Party Polarization and Judicial Independence 191 
 
 
effect of a one-unit increase in the independent variable.89 Using this average 
response, results from model 1 indicate that a country with high polarization 
will increase the average tenure of high courts by 1.1 years. For purposes of 
comparison, this average increase is similar to the result obtained using an 
OLS regression model (see Appendix 2). 
  
                                                 
89  A Colin Cameron and Pravin Trivedi, 'Essentials of Count Data Regression' in 
Badi Baltagi (ed), A Companion to Theoretical Econometrics (Blackwell Press 2001) 334. 
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Table 2. Results: Adoption of Judicial Independence Rules. 
 Model 1  
(term length, years) 
Model 2  
(terms, 
indexed) 
Model 3  
(Feld-Voigt 
Index) 





























Log-Likelihood -90.82 -36.06 25.70 
AIC 199.55 85.54  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 19.24** 20.55**  
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.22 0.16 
Estimator Negative Binomial Ordered Logit Beta 
N 36 36 36 
*p ≤0.10, ** p ≤0.05. Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are two-
tailed. The variables used in these tests do not suffer from problems of 
collinearity, or excessive covariance. A simple correlation tests finds only one 
pair of variables (common law origin and constitutional appointers at 0.37) 
has a correlation score above 0.15. A test to determine whether variables have 
equal means can be rejected at p ≤ 0.05. Additionally, log-likelihood and AIC 
scores for all models are lower using the above models as compared to the 
null model. Luxembourg was removed from this analysis because the 
judiciary is solely responsible for appointments (Elkins et al (n 64)). However, 
results remain nearly identical with the inclusion of Luxembourg.  
Perhaps most notable is the effect of polarization given the presence of a 
control for common law legal systems. Common law systems certainly have 
longer tenures, on average, than other legal systems, a finding that is in 
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accordance with previous research.90 Yet, even accounting for this effect, 
countries with greater polarization at the time judicial review is established 
are given longer terms in office. Notably, no country with low polarization 
provides life tenure for courts of judicial review. Nor are the countries with 
life tenure exclusively common law systems: Austria, Belgium, Armenia, 
Estonia, and Turkey are some of the many countries providing judges with 
life tenure. 
Table 2 also shows results of the ordered logit models using the four-part term 
length index (see Model 2). Results using this specification of the dependent 
variable are substantively similar to the first set of models: party polarization 
is associated with longer term lengths given to high court judges, even when 
accounting for numerous alternative explanations. One way of getting a 
better understanding of the coefficients from an ordered logit model is to 
examine predicted probabilities of the outcome (length of tenures) as party 
polarization increases. When polarization is at its mean level (2.8), the 
likelihood of adopting life tenure for courts of constitutional review is 63 
percent. However, when polarization is high (a score of 4.1), the likelihood of 
adopting life tenure rises to over 82 percent. Conversely, when polarization 
decreases by one standard deviation (ie, when polarization falls from 2.8 to 
1.5), the likelihood of adopting strong rules declines to under 39 percent. 
These dramatic differences in probability illustrate the strong role of party 
polarization at the time judicial independence rules are created. 
Finally, I examine the effect of party polarization on the 12-part battery of 
judicial independence institutions described by Feld and Voigt.91 As shown 
in Model 3, polarization remains a strong predictor of this larger set of judicial 
independence rules.92 Due to potential endogeneity with the dependent 
variable, I exclude the number of constitutional appointers from the list of 
control variables in this test. Recall, however, that the Feld and Voigt index 
examines the existence of rules encouraging judicial independence as of 2003, 
which creates some temporal disconnect between my primary independent 
variable (party polarization at the time judicial review is established) and the 
                                                 
90 Ginsburg (n 1); La Porta et al (n 63). 
91 See n 61-62 for a full summary of the 12 factors in Feld and Voigt's index. 
92 Regression diagnostics of the model's residuals suggest no change is needed to the 
model specifications. 
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outcome measured. However, given the difficulty of institutional change, 
recent research by Hayo and Voigt has shown there is a large amount of 
consistency over time in the judicial independence rules contained in the 
Feld and Voigt index.93 In fact, they find 85 percent of constitutions never 
experience a single change in judicial independence rules after those rules 
were created. Thus, the results from this final test indicate the perpetuation 
of strong judicial independence rules in polarized party systems while also 
showing (albeit more imperfectly) a connection between polarized party 
systems and the creation of judicial independence rules. 
In sum, the findings from all models in Table 2 provide strong corroboration 
for the idea that polarization among political parties drives the creation and 
maintenance of strong judicial independence rules. Parties in polarized 
systems should be more concerned than parties in non-polarized systems 
about the potential consequences of being out of power. To mitigate the 
effects of being out of power, parties in polarized political systems are more 
likely to adopt judicial review and agree to institutional rules that provide the 
judiciary with independence from other political actors – specifically, from 
current legislative majorities. The results also indicate that it may be 
necessary to re-think previous theories that focus exclusively on party 
competition as the driver of judicial independence particularly and the 
establishment of minoritarian institutions in general. Though party 
competition, broadly conceived, should matter to these decisions, the 
findings in this study show that the more complex concept of party 
polarization – the quality or depth of division between parties on a left-right 
scale – ultimately contributes most to the decision to create independent 
courts.  
These results also have substantive significance for modern governance. They 
show that polarized party systems – those potentially in greatest need of 
institutional safeguards – may be able to devise rules that help protect the 
integrity of democratic institutions and the political process. Severe policy 
splits among the major parties are potentially destabilizing to government 
                                                 
93 Hayo and Voigt (n 41) 188-89. Examining a 50-year period, their findings show that 
over 85 percent of all constitutions remain unchanged with regard to judicial 
independence rules. This is all the more remarkable when considering that there is 
56 percent likelihood of political system breakdown.  
2017}  Party Polarization and Judicial Independence 195 
 
 
performance, and polarization in the party system places those systems at the 
greatest risk for destabilization and poor governance outcomes.94 Yet, 
independent courts can help to constrain such extreme position taking and 
encourage policy moderation – a statement that is all the more true at the 
highest court of constitutional review.95 Similarly, independent courts can 
potentially punish recalcitrant officers in government, and can provide even 
a divided political system with a forum to legitimate government decisions. 
Yet, for these benefits to accrue political actors in those polarized systems 
must provide judges with the formal protections to encourage independence 
in thought and action. The results here suggest that political actors do 
provide courts with the independence to make government work.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Developing the rule of law has become an important marker for good 
democratic performance, and independent judiciaries with the power to 
oversee the grand constitutional bargain are increasingly viewed as the most 
significant institutional check on parliamentary and governmental actions. 
Given the potentially important role courts can have in overseeing 
government and society, political actors certainly have incentives to restrict 
court power, but also to allow judicial power to grow. While most existing 
theory focuses on party competition generally to explain why politicians 
provide judicial power, the evidence presented here suggests it is the extremity 
of policy difference between parties – ie, the polarization within party 
systems – that is more strongly associated with the willingness of parties to 
establish and maintain strong rules of judicial independence. By focusing on 
polarization, this study does not intend to depreciate the importance of 
competition among parties. Without meaningful party competition, the 
need to establish strong judicial powers likely would not arise. And, in fact, 
party competition does best explain why different countries choose to adopt 
the institution of judicial review. Yet, in systems in which parties do compete 
for power, a richer characteristic – the polarization that exists among the 
parties – better explains the establishment of longer term lengths, which 
encourages strong court independence. Higher polarization at the time of 
                                                 
94 Frye (n 19).  
95 Stone Sweet (n 52) 52; Landes and Posner (n 28).  
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adoption also encourages the perpetuation of strong independence rules, as 
seen through the Feld and Voigt index of judicial independence. 
There are compelling reasons to believe that the polarization within political 
systems should lead to the development of strong checks on governmental 
power. The vast disparity of views within polarized systems may result in a 
greater need for a third-party actor to adjudicate disputes. Specifically, 
constitutional texts may be underspecified, and in need of judicial 
interpretation. Alternatively, legislation passed in parliament may be 
potentially threatening to the long-term functioning of the democratic 
system of government. Establishing a strong and independent court with the 
powers to adjudicate constitutional disputes can relieve some of the pressure 
polarized party systems place on the functioning of government. 
At the same time, while the results presented here focus on judicial review 
powers and judicial independence, the ideas need not be limited to courts. 
This story could help us understand the establishment of and independence 
given to other non-majoritarian democratic institutions in government. A 
similar logic could apply to central bank independence. Jeong et al. find that 
the creators of the Federal Reserve System provided the bank with 
independence protections largely as a consequence of the competition and 
mistrust between the major competing interests seeking monetary policy 
reform – Wall Street bankers, rural farmers, populists, and small business 
owners.96 This example suggests that the extent of partisan disagreement 
among political actors or interests could contribute to the desire of political 
actors to promote power and independence in other democratic institutions, 
as well.  
Overall, this study demonstrates a clear relationship between polarized party 
systems and the development of strong judicial powers. The results indicate 
that parties in the legislature, or groups establishing a constitution, may 
recognize the potential need for third-party adjudication and respond to that 
need with appropriate institutions and rules. In this sense, the results shown 
here ultimately indicate something hopeful: that parties are able to correctly 
recognize and provide mechanisms to ease anticipated future problems in 
governing.  
                                                 
96 Jeong et al (n 3).  






Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Polarization: 
Establishment of  
Judicial Independence 
2.81 5.36 0.57 1.27 
Polarization: 
Establishment of  
Judicial Review 
3.69 8.64 0.04 1.76 
Common Law 0.10 1 0 0.31 
Const. Appointers 2.13 4 1 0.96 
Tenure 11.35 16 2 4.01 
Party Competition 15.18 59.0 0.3 12.85 
Feld-Voigt Index 0.66 0.89 0.39 0.13 
Legal Origin 0.48 0.80 0 0.31 
Common Borders 0.46 1 0 0.39 
Common Religion 0.40 0.96 0 0.40 
 
  
Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics. This table presents the 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in Tables 1 and 2. 






Model 1  
(term length, years) 
Model 2  
(term length, 
indexed) 
Model 3  
(Feld-Voigt Index) 





























R2 0.44 0.44 0.18 
N 36 36 36 
 Note: **p ≤0.05. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
  
Appendix 2: OLS Regression results. 
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104: Military: Positive 
105: Military: Negative 
106: Peace 
107: Internationalism: Positive 
201: Freedom and Human Rights 
202: Democracy: Favorable 
203: Constitutionalism: Positive 
305: Political Authority 
401: Free Enterprise 
402: Economic Incentives 
403: Market Regulation 
404: Economic Planning 
406: Protectionism: Positive 
407: Protectionism: Negative 
412: Controlled Economy 
413: Nationalism 
414: Economic Orthodoxy 
504: Welfare State Expansion 
505: Welfare State Limitation 
506: Education Expansion 
601: National Way of Life: Positive 
603: Traditional Morality: Positive 
605: Law and Order  
606: Social Harmony 
701: Labor Groups: Positive 
  
 
Appendix 4.  Categories used to create the Manifesto Project 
left-right score (used to create the party polarization index).  
 


















Albania 1991 9 2 2 0 0 1.22 27.1 
Armenia 1997 16 4 2 0 0 3.20 25.8 
Austria 1945 16 4 4 1 0 4.20 5.2 
Belgium 1980 16 4 2 1 0 2.82 6.6 
Bulgaria 1991 9 2 3 0 0 0.57 1.3 
Canada 1982 16 4 1 0 1 2.75 18.1 
Croatia 1990 8 2 1 1 0 1.27 12.1 
Czech Rep. 1993 10 3 3 1 0 1.51 3.2 
Estonia 1991 16 4 1 0 0 3.92 8.4 
Finland 2000 16 4 1 1 0 3.83 0.5 
France 1958 9 2 3 1 0 5.18 10.9 
Georgia 1995 10 3 3 0 0 1.94 16.8 
Germany 1949 12 3 2 1 0 3.52 4.0 
Greece 1974 2 1 1 1 0 3.45 34.3 
Hungary 1989 9 2 1 1 0 1.46 3.3 
Ireland 1945 16 4 1 0 1 4.96 28.4 
Israel 1992 16 4 3 0 0 5.06 9.8 
Italy 1948 12 2 3 1 0 3.21 17.5 
Japan 1947 16 4 1 0 1 2.32 5.1 
Latvia 1996 10 3 3 0 0 4.20 3.1 
Lithuania 1993 9 2 3 0 0 2.52 22.8 
Macedonia 1992 9 2 1 1 0 1.31 5.8 
Moldova 1994 6 1 3 0 0 1.21 21.1 
Montenegro 2007 9 2 1 1 0 3.16 6.8 
Poland 1992 8 2 1 1 0 3.09 0.3 
Appendix 5.  Data used for Table 2.  
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Portugal 1982 6 1 2 1 0 2.29 18.2 
Romania 1991 6 1 3 1 0 2.96 59 
Russia 1990 16 4 2 0 0 5.36 7.4 
S. Korea 1988 6 1 3 1 0 1.60 10.0 
Serbia 2006 9 2 3 1 0 1.65 52.0 
Slovakia 1993 9 2 2 1 0 1.34 22.6 
Slovenia 1992 9 2 2 1 0 3.77 9.3 
Spain 1978 9 2 4 1 0 2.18 5.1 
Sweden 1979 16 4 1 1 0 3.65 18.6 
Turkey 1961 16 4 3 1 0 2.21 2.0 
Ukraine 1996 9 2 3 0 0 1.09 7.6 
